




















The CAD model posits a mapping of contempt, anger, and disgust onto the moral codes of community, autonomy, and divinity (respectively). A recent study by Hutcherson and Gross [Hutcherson, C.A. & Gross, J.J. (2011). The moral emotions: A social-functionalist account of anger, disgust, and contempt.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,100,719-737] posited moral disgust as the dominant other-condemning emotion across all three moral codes.  However, the methodology used may have incidentally increased the relevance of disgust. In the current experiment, one condition repeated Hutcherson and Gross’ procedure, while in another condition we added the word “moral” to three other emotions. Consistent with CAD, anger had the highest intensity ratings in response to autonomy violations, whereas “grossed out” was the dominant response to divinity violations. Furthermore, the adjective “moral” increased the relevance of anger, contempt, and fear in irrelevant domains, which suggests that the adjective "moral" increases any emotion’s moral relevance. 





Effects of the Word “Moral” on the Moral Relevance of Disgust (and Other Emotions) 

Recent research has emphasized the role that emotions play in our moral judgments. It has been suggested that emotions often guide our approval or condemnation for the actions of others (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2007; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). TIn particular, the moral emotion of disgust has attracted a large amount of research attention. ResearchersIn particular, researchers have proposed different theories of the role that disgust plays in morality, as distinct from anger and contempt. However, to date it is difficult to bring understanding to this research field because these morally-condemning emotions have been measured using different methodology. Therefore, the literature to date leaves open the questions of how we should define moral disgust, and what measures should be used to study it to study this moral emotion. The current research has implications for both of these essential questions. 
The CAD hypothesis suggests that disgust plays a unique role in morality (Rozin et al., 1999).  It proposes that the “other-condemning” moral emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust correspond to violations of three distinct moral codes, proposed by Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997)—with contempt corresponding to violations of community violations (or the duties and obligations of a social role or class); anger corresponding to violations of autonomy violations (or the rights of an individual), and disgust corresponding to violations of divinity violations (or the religious and natural order). In the initial tests of the CAD model, Rozin et al. had American and Japanese students indicate how much they would feel anger, disgust, and contempt towards 46 immoral acts, each related to one of the three moral codes. The results were generally supportedtive of the proposed mapping between the other-condemning emotions and the three moral domains. The only exception was that the mapping of contempt- to community associationviolations was relatively weaker than anger-autonomy and disgust-divinity. A particular strength of this research is that it used both emotion words and facial emotion displays to measure anger, disgust, and contempt. This method is useful because previous research has found that the semantic terms “anger” and “disgust” are frequently correlated and often used interchangeably (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1989; J. A. Russell & Fehr, 1994; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987). Additionally, Ekman, O’Sullivan, and Matsumoto (1991) have argued that individuals cannot reliably label contempt because English speakers often do not know what the term means.  Indeed, when assessed via open choice, subjects do not reliably label the contempt expression as “contempt” (Wagner, 2000).
However, other research has put forth the  statedargument that disgust is sovereign to all kinds of immoral acts, not just limited to divinity violations (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; cf. Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993; Haidt, Rozin, MacCauley & Imada, 1997).  Research by Hutcherson and Gross (2011) has endeavored to determine whether moral disgust is the predominant response to all three CAD domainsmoral codes. In Study 1 they researchers replicated and extended studies by Rozin et al. (1999), however, they only used emotion words. They sought to make clear to participants a distinction between moral and non-moral disgust by affixing the term “moral” to disgust, and by giving participants thean alternative emotion term “grossed out” as an option for non-moral disgust. These researchers predicted that participants would have a preference for moral disgust as their emotional response toward all three CAD violations, in comparison to other moral (anger, contempt) and non-moral emotions (sadness, fear/anxiety, and grossed out). TIndeed, they found that moral disgust was experienced more intensely than any other emotion in response to both community and autonomy violations, though not divinity violations (which elicited both moral and non-moral disgust). 
It was admirable that this research tried to distinguish different forms of disgust. However, one limitation of their approach was that by affixing the term “moral” to the emotion “disgust,” while omitting “moral” from all the other emotions, they authors might have incidentally increased the relevance of this combined “moral + disgust” term as a response to all moral violations. In other words, the preferential selection of the item “moral disgust” as a response to autonomy and community violations may simply be an artefact of the suitability of the word “moral” to a moral context. Thus, the term “moral disgust” may not capture a distinct type of disgust, but is simply perceived as a suitable response to all moral violations because of the moral connotation. 
In the present study, we sought to examine whether the word “moral” influences the relevance of emotion terms to the three CAD domains. Specifically, we sought to determine if adding the term “moral” to the other CAD emotions of anger and contempt—or even to a non-moral negative emotion such as fear—would influence the intensity and preference for these emotions as suitable responses to the three CAD domainsmoral violations. We hypothesized that simply adding the word “moral” to emotions (, such as anger, contempt, and fear), would increase their judged relevance to any moral violation. Furthermore, we reasoned that if this effect reflects a semantic artefact rather than a genuine expression of a morally relevant emotion, and the CAD model is overall valid, then the effect of adding the word “moral” should be particularly strong in emotion-domain combinations where the CAD model predicts the emotion should be less relevant (that is, community and divinity for anger, autonomy and divinity for contempt, and all domains for fear). 
To test our hypothesis, the present experiment  we present here includes a duplicate of Hutcherson and Gross’ (2011) Study 1 as a control condition, and a comparison condition in which, in addition to the term “moral disgust,” the word “moral” was affixed to the other-condemning moral emotions of anger and contempt, and. In this other condition we also added “moral” to the emotion of al term “fear/anxiety”, which is normally classed as a non-moral emotionnot usually classed among the morally relevant emotions (e.g., see Haidt, 2003). 




	Participants were 245 adults (128 male, 116 female, 1 did not disclose) who participated via the Mechanical Turk online job service in exchange for compensation. Mechanical Turk was used to recruit a more diverse samplesample  of participants (in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, and education) than generally obtained via university samples (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). The mean age of the sample was 31.11 years (SD = 11.70). NThe nationalities werey of the sample was 58.4% United States, 29.4% Indian, and 12.2% other nationalities. EThe ethnicity of the sample was fairly diverse: 54.3% White/Caucasian, 35.5% Asian, 3.7% Latin American/Hispanic, 3.7% Black/African American/African Caribbean, and 2.9% mixed or other ethnicity. 

Design
	We used a single factor (pure replication vs. moral version) between-subjects design. The between-subjects variable was whether the word “moral” was affixed to the emotion terms anger, contempt, and fear/anxiety (i.e., “moral anger”, “moral contempt”, “moral fear/anxiety”) or not. IThus, in the pure replication (n = 111), participants were provided the following emotion labels: anger, contempt, moral disgust, sadness, fear/anxiety, and grossed out. In the moral version (n = 134), the choices were: moral anger, moral contempt, moral disgust, sadness, moral fear/anxiety, and grossed out.

Materials and procedure
	WeOur materials and procedures were modeled our study after Hutcherson and Gross’s Study 1 (2011, Study 1), with only a few amendments. First, Hutcherson and Gross (2011) included only two divinity vignettes, though they included nine autonomy and 12 community vignettes. We agree with Hutcherson and Gross that many of the actions offered by Rozin et al. (1999) as divinity violations do not qualify as moral transgressions (e.g., eating rotten meat), but we thought the scarcity of divinity items presented a methodological limitation. Thus, we adapted four items from Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009), which they used to assess attitudes towards “purity” violations (a reconceptualization of the CAD divinity category). These items were: (a) someone gets plastic surgery done that adds a 2-inch tail on the end of their spine; (b) someone cooks and eats their pet dog, after it dies of natural causes; (c) a dance group performs an art piece in which all participants act like animals for 30 minutes, including crawling around naked and urinating on stage; and (d) a man goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a dead chicken, but before cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it. Though it could be argued these acts have no direct consequences for people other than the actors themselves, and thus do not represent “moral” actions, Graham et al. (2009) have found that some people do treat these actions as moral violations—that is, they believe the acts are punishable, universally wrong, and are extremely reluctant to engage in these actions (see also Nichols, 2002, for similar argument about disgusting acts). Thus, in all, we had six divinity items and 27 total violations. 
Second, vignettesmoral violations were presented in the random order used by Rozin et al. (1999), —mixing items from different groups—as opposed to grouping items together by violation type. This was done to avoid participants perceiving any conceptual connections between the items, and thus treating them uniformly by CAD domain. In Hutcherson and Gross (2011), unlike the original Rozin et al. (1999) study, vignettes were presented in blocks, with the autonomy violations first, followed by community and then divinity violations (C. Hutcherson, personal communication, June 8 2011). Participants may have thus selected “moral disgust” most strongly for autonomy violations because they had not seen any divinity violations yet, and wanted to express their moral disapproval using any emotion of condemnation with “moral” attached to it. However, if scenarios had been presented in a random or varied order, the greater applicability of moral disgust to divinity violations, and anger to autonomy violations, might have become more evident. We therefore presented scenarios in a mixed order in our study.




	Emotional intensity ratings were aggregated by CAD violation type , producing separate means for autonomy, community, and divinity violations (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations as a function of condition). Following Hutcherson and Gross, we conducted paired t tests on emotional intensity ratings for all 15 combinations of emotion pairs, reporting significant differences below a threshold of p < .003, the Bonferroni-corrected alpha level for 15 comparisons (.05/15). We conducted this analysis both on the entire sample and with participants with a self-reported U.S. nationality only. The results were almost identical; thus, we report  here the results for the entire sample. We also report the frequency with which each emotion was selected as the best descriptive term (see Table 2 for frequencies and percentages as a function of condition and violation type). Though there were a few main effects of gender on emotion intensity, particularly indicating that women (M = 4.92, SD = 1.05) more than men (M = 4.38, SD = 1.04) were grossed out by divinity violations, F(1, 240) = 16.04, p < .001, and men (M = 2.63, SD = 1.43) more than women (M = 1.92, SD = 1.22) were grossed out by community violations, F(1, 240) = 17.02, p < .001, there were no interactions at all between gender and condition. We therefore report the results collapsing across gender, similar to Hutcherson and Gross. Finally, we conducted a one-way MANOVA of condition on emotion intensity ratings for autonomy, community, and divinity violations to test the effects of the word “moral” on these ratings.

[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here]

	Across the nine autonomy violations and in both conditions, anger was given the highest mean intensity rating, compared to the other emotions (see Table 1), consistent with the CAD model. Moreover, anger received significantly higher intensity ratings than all other emotions in both conditions. Moral disgust received the second highest intensity ratings, but only significantly higher intensity ratings than contempt in the pure replication (i.e., moral disgust and moral contempt were rated equally intense in the moral version). Sadness, fear, and grossed out were rated significantly lower than the other emotions in both conditions. Consistent with the intensity ratings, anger was selected as the best descriptive emotion for autonomy violations in both conditions. Analysis of the effects of condition within autonomy violations revealed an increased preference for the emotions contempt, F(1, 243) = 5.11, p < .03, and fear/anxiety¸ F(1, 243) = 14.59, p < .001, simply due to affixing the word “moral” to these terms. Sadness was also chosen to a greater extent in the moral version, compared to the pure replication, F(1, 243) = 5.78, p < .02, though it did not receive the “moral” affixture (all other ps > .10). 
	Across the 12 community violations, anger was given the highest intensity ratings above all other emotions. However, in neither condition was anger rated significantly higher than moral disgust, and in the moral version, moral contempt was rated on par with moral anger, moral disgust, and sadness.  Again, grossed out and fear were rated significantly lower than the other emotions, in both versions.  Consistent with the intensity ratings, anger was selected as the best descriptive emotion for this domain in the pure replication. However, in the moral version, the non-moral emotion of sadness was selected as the best descriptive emotion for community violations. Nevertheless, moral anger and moral contempt were also selected at a fairly high rate. Regarding the effects of the word “moral” for community violations, there was an increased preference for moral fear/anxiety than for non-moral fear/anxiety, F(1, 243) = 7.67, p < .01. No other emotion differed in this group due to condition, ps > .10.
	Across the six divinity violations, as expected, grossed out (i.e., non-moral disgust) was given the highest intensity ratings above all other emotions. However, in both conditions, it was not rated significantly higher than moral disgust. This is most likely due to participants treating grossed out and moral disgust as a single construct (see factor analysis below). Across conditions, anger, contempt, sadness, and fear were rated significantly lower than moral and non-moral disgust in this domain. Consistent with emotion intensity ratings, grossed out was rated the best descriptive emotion for this domain, though moral disgust was also highly rated. Finally, regarding the effects of condition for divinity violations, there was an increased preference for moral anger compared to anger, F(1, 243) = 4.66, p < .04, moral contempt compared to contempt, F(1, 243) = 5.15, p < .03, and moral fear/anxiety compared to fear/anxiety, F(1, 243) = 8.41, p < .01, in this domain. No other significant differences were observed in this group due to condition, ps > .12.	 

Emotion factors emerging in each CAD domain




In the present study, we found that one consequence of affixing the word “moral” to a moral emotion term—including anger, contempt, and disgust—is to increases the emotion’s perceived relevance as a response to a moral transgression. Moreover, we also found that the addition of the word “moral” can even increase the relevance of a negative non-moral emotion  not usually classified as moral in nature (fear/anxiety). Consistent with our predictions and the CAD model, yet less consistent with the findings of Hutcherson and Gross’ findings, for violations of autonomy, anger had the highest intensity ratings and was selected as most relevant emotion across conditions (i.e., in both the pure replication and  the moral version). Adding the word “moral” to contempt in our study increased its intensity in the autonomy domain on par with moral disgust. Also consistent with predictions and the CAD model and somewhat consistent with Hutcherson and Gross, for divinity violations, grossed out (i.e., non-moral disgust) hadwas given the highest intensity ratings and was selected as the best descriptive emotion across conditions, though moral disgust was also highly relevant. However, the relevance of moral disgust for divinity violations can be attributed to participants treating the moral and non-moral disgust as a single construct in this domain, as confirmed by factor analysis. 
The factor analysis further revealed context effects of the CAD domains on the meaning of the term “moral disgust.” In response to divinity violations, moral and non-moral disgust loaded onto a single construct. This was not the casetrue for other types of violations;, for example, moral disgust loaded with anger and contempt in the autonomy domain, separate from non-moral disgust.  This finding is consistent withsupports the idea that the word “disgust” signifies a state closer to anger, when applied to autonomy violations (e.g., see Bloom, 2004), and the addition of the word “moral” seems to only enhance the use of this metaphor. This reinforces other findings that disgust language is most separate from anger when reacting to bodily violationsdivinity violations, e.g., a sexual or eating moral norm (Gutierrez, Giner-Sorolla, & Vasiljevic, in press; P.S. Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a, b, c). In the context of non-bodily violationsautonomy violations, e. g. of harm or fairness norms, these studies showed that the expression “moral disgust” is was more strongly related to anger than to non-moral disgust. 
Results for community violations were less conclusive.  Contrary to both the CAD model and Hutcherson and Gross’ findings, across conditionsin community violations had anger was the most strongly felt emotion, and anger was selected as the best descriptive emotion in the pure replication. In the moral version, sadness (a non-moral emotion) was selected as the most relevant emotion to community violations. OThus, overall our results support at least the “AD” mappings of the CAD model, while further demonstrating the inconsistent nature of the “C” mapping.  We suspect that sadness was selected as the best descriptive emotion forwas related to community violations in the moral version of the study because community violations tend to be viewed as less serious offenses than autonomy and divinity violations (see Rozin et al., 1999). Many of our participants may not have considered community violations as serious as the other moral offenses, as shown by their generally lower negative emotion means in our study. This may explain why they found the only non-moral, non-disgust emotion as the best descriptive emotion in this case—they were searching for an emotion category that would not connote express strong moral condemnation, and sadness was the only option available to them. This rationale is supported by the fact thatSupporting this explanation, anger was selected as the best descriptive emotion for this domain in the pure replication condition  (i.e., when other negative emotions without the term “moral” were available), but not the moral version. These finding also suggests a limitation of the original CAD studies (Rozin et al., 1999), which did not provide participants with a non-moral, negative emotion option. 
In Hutcherson and Gross’s study, and contrasting withunlike previous research, moral disgust was rated significantly higher than anger for autonomy violations, though anger was rated quite high as well. However, in this experiment we found that anger was the dominant response to autonomy violations, thus, replicating Rozin et al.’s (1999) original finding. TA plausible reason for this may have to do with the different characters ofdifferences between our samples. We used an older non-university sample, whereas Hutcherson and Gross used a younger university sample. It may be that college students are more flexible with their use of the term “disgust” when responding to autonomy violations, whereas non-students prefer anger as their prototype moral emotion in this domain. Perhaps educational level or English-language proficiency influences whether anger or moral disgust is preferred as a n emotional response to autonomy violations. Though we did not collect this demographic information in our researchstudy, a recent study of 1,000 MTurk workers suggests showed that both Americans and Indians workers are likely to have at least a college-level education (Ipeirotis, 2010). This suggests that our MTurk sample, which was comprised of mainly American and Indian workers, may not be very different from Hutcherson and Gross’s sample in terms of educational level. Furthermore, English-language proficiency may not be the primary source of the difference, as our results were the same even with non-Americans removed from the sample. Whatever the reason for the difference, future studies using both terminological and facial-display items are certainly needed to more carefully tease apart the role of anger and disgust as reactions to autonomy violations, since previous research indicates that this ishas suggested that this may be a reliable method of dealing with problems (e.g., local idiosyncrasies) of the English language.
 One potential limitation of our methodology is that we did not include a condition where the term “disgust” was presented without the adjective “moral”. Instead, we followed the procedure used by Hutcherson and Gross, and provided participants with the synonym “grossed out” as a stand-in for the term “disgust”. We argue that greater endorsement of “moral disgust” compared to non-moral “grossed out”, as a response to community and autonomy violations in our study and Hutcherson and Gross’s study may be attributed to the addition of the word “moral” to the disgust term. Alternatively, it could be that some third variable that distinguishes moral disgust from the other moral emotions moral anger, moral contempt, and moral fear, better accounts for the enhanced endorsement of moral disgust. PFor example, perhaps native English speakers understand the meaning of moral disgust, while finding the terms “moral anger”, “moral contempt”, and “moral fear” unclear. This inscrutability may have , in turn, caused participants in our study to attend more avidly to the word “moral” when applying these terms.  To investigate this possibility, we asked conducted a brief pilot study. Eightyeighty-two American English-speakers rated how certain they were that they understood the meaning of the four moral-emotion terms on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all certain of its meaning; 5 = Moderately certain of its meaning; 9 = Very certain of its meaning). We found that participants were certain of the meaning of moral anger (M = 5.94, SD = 2.57), moral disgust (M = 6.51, SD = 2.34), and moral contempt (M = 6.17, SD = 2.35), all above the midpoint of the scale, though less certain of the meaning of moral fear (M = 4.83, SD = 2.67), slightly below the midpoint.  These results, along with the fact that the moral terms were endorsed to a greater extent than their non-moral counterparts, make it unlikely that differences in comprehension are behind the effect “moral” had on the emotion terms in our study. 

Implications for using the word “moral” to qualify disgust
In our moral version of the our study, the word “moral” had the predicted “moralizing” effect on emotion ratings. TIn other words, the word “moral””Moral” seemed to increase the relevance of various emotions as responses to moral transgressions, but only when the emotion by itself was not recognized as a prevailing response to the scenario. Across the three CAD domains, affixing “moral” to fear/anxiety significantly increased the initially low intensity ratings of this emotion. Moreover, the word “moral” also increased the intensity of the  moral emotions of anger and contempt in domains where the CAD model and our findings predicts these emotions should not be relevant. Therefore, it seems that adding the word “moral” can increase the perceived relevance of any emotion term to a moral situation, including ones not usually thought of as having moral relevance.
The present findings hafindings have ve theoretical and empirical implications for researchers who studying the other-condemning moral emotions. This research suggests that it is important for rResearchers shouldto take care when measuring moral emotions because participants may not agree with researchers on the meaning of emotion terms, such as moral disgust or contempt.  Moreover, our findings warn against adopting the term “moral disgust” as a measure of disgust in moral contexts, as the adjective “moral” does not seem to increase the intensity of theoretically relevant emotion responses, only. It does however increase the intensity of  non-relevant ones. This raises questions about whether the “moral” adjective is really getting at a distinctt emotional state, or just awareness about the applicability of the moral context to the item. In some ways asking about “moral disgust” and not moral anger or contempt is similar to asking whether a fire engine is burgundy, vermilion or “fire-engine red.” 
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Emotion Intensity Ratings forin the Context of Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Violations (Aggregated) as a Function of Condition.
















Frequency of “Best Descriptive” Emotion for Community, Autonomy, and Divinity Violations (Aggregated) as a Function of Condition.










Note. Highest percentage of “best descriptive” emotion for each row is shown in boldface. Replication = pure replication of Hutcherson and Gross (2011, Study 1) with the adjective “moral” only for disgust (N = 111). Moral Version = replication of Hutcherson and Gross (2011, Study 1) with the adjective “moral” for anger, contempt, disgust, and fear (N = 134). A = autonomy violations (9 items); C = community violations (12 items); D = divinity violations (6 items).







